Supreme Court Rejects Heightened Evidentiary Standards for So-Called “Reverse Discrimination” Claims

On June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that plaintiffs bringing discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) cannot be required to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard based on their status as members of a majority group.

The petitioner in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, Marlean Ames, is a heterosexual woman who has been employed with the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. She filed a lawsuit against the agency alleging that she was denied promotion to a management position that was instead offered to a lesbian woman, and that she was subsequently demoted and replaced by a gay man, each in violation of Title VII. The district court applied the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which requires that a Title VII plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason offered by the defendant is pretext for intentional discrimination. In applying this framework, the district court concluded that the petitioner had not met her prima facie burden, because she had not presented evidence of “background circumstances” suggesting that the agency was “the rare employer who discriminates against members of a majority group.” The agency’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court rejected the lower courts’ application of a heightened prima facie standard only for majority-group plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the language of Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against “any individual” because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or other protected characteristic. This language does not distinguish between majority and minority groups. The court also cited the Supreme Court precedent going back decades, which confirmed that Title VII prohibits discrimination against majority-group plaintiffs upon the same standards applicable to plaintiffs in a minority group. Thus, a majority-group plaintiff needs only to meet the same prima facie standard applied to minority-group plaintiffs and cannot be required to provide evidence of additional “background circumstances” suggesting a discriminatory motive.

The court did not address the merits of the agency’s summary judgment motion, including whether the petitioner met the applicable prima facie standard. The case was remanded to the District Court to decide these issues consistent with the court’s ruling. Although the concurring opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Gorsuch questions the validity of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in its entirety (at least as applied on summary judgment), the majority opinion does not disturb the applicability of the framework generally.

Prior to the ruling, each of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts had applied a heightened prima facie standard for majority-group plaintiffs. Moving forward, the Ames decision makes clear that there is no evidentiary distinction between claims based on so-called “reverse discrimination” against majority groups, and claims alleging discrimination against minority groups; both are equally prohibited by Title VII. This ruling is likely to inform the outcome of legal challenges to President Trump’s various executive orders related to affirmative action and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives as these challenges move through the courts.